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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

JOSE M. OROSCZO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs-

lVESTERN PACIFIC RAILROAD
COl\IPANY,

Case No.
12623

Defendant-Respondent,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S
STATEMENTS
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of
the nature of the case and the disposition of the matter in the lower court. Respondent also agrees with
much of appellant's statement of the facts. Any disagreements respondent has with appellant's statement
of the facts, or any additions to said statement which
respondent believes necessary will be discussed where
relevant in the J\rgument section of this brief.
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ARGUl\1ENT
POINT I
APPELLANT IN POINT I OF HIS BRIEF
CONFUSES AFFIRl\,IATIVE DEFENSES
WITH FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE ELEl\1ENTS OF A CAUSE OF ACTION.
Appellant in Point I of his Argument states that
the Federal Employers' Liability Act ( FELA), 45
U.S.C. § 51 et seq., abolishes the common law defenses
of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the
fellow servant doctrine. This claim is somewhat of an
overstatement, since much remains of these doctrines
under the FELA. See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 54 (" ... shall
not be held to have assumed the risks of his employment ... " [Emphasis added.]) Siciliano v. Denver &
R. G. W. R. Co., 12 Utah 2d 183, 364 P.2d 413, 415
( 1961) (In one sense, assumption of risk has not been
written out of the law.); and 45 U.S.C. § 53 (The act
doesn't abolish the defense of contributory negligence,
but rather abolishes its common law status as a complete bar to any recovery.). Appellant's overstatement,
however, is unimportant since respondent does not rely
upon any of the affirmative defenses listed in Point I
of Appellant's Brief to sustain the trial court's judgment. Respondent did not argue below, and does not
now contend that it is entitled to judgment because as-
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sumption of risk, contributory negligence, or the
fellow servent rule bars an otherwise valid claim.
Rather, it is respondent's position that the trial court,
sitting as the trier of fact, determined that the appellant did not prove his case, and the evidence is sufficient
to support this determination.
POINT II
APPELLANT HAD THE BURDEN OF
PROVING BY THE PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE THAT THE RESPONDENT
\VAS NEGLIGENT AND THAT THIS NEGLIGENCE 'VAS THE PROXIMATE CAUSE
OF HIS INJURY.
The plaintiff-appellant alleged in his complaint
that he had suffered injury as a result of either the intentional or negligent acts of an employee of respondent's. It is noteworthy that the language of the FELA
does not appear to allow recovery against an employer
for the intentional torts of his employees. 45 U.S.C. §
51. Thus, many cases have stated that "negligence remains the sole basis of liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act." I-l erdman v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 228 F. 2d 902, 903 (6 Cir. 1955), aff'd, 352 U.S.
518 ( 1957), quoting, Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co., 318 U.S. 54 (1943); Siciliano v. Denver &
R. G. W.R. Co., 12 Utah 2d 183, 364 P.2d 413 (1961),
appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 979.
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However, there are some cases which have held that in
certain limited situations an FELA action will lie
against an employer because of the intentional acts of
his employees. E.g., Slaughter v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co., 302 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (The intentional
tort was thought by the employee to be in furtherance
of the employer's interest.); Harrison v. Missouri P.R.
Co., 372 U.S. 248 (1963) (The employer was negligent in hiring a person with violent propensities) .
Respondent does not dispute the proposition that
intentional torts may give rise to FELA liability, but
merely points out that negligence is the only cause of
action authorized by the express statutory language.
There are not two separate statutes with one authorizing suit for intentional torts. Thus, anything courts
state about plaintiff's burden of proving negligence
under the statute, is equally applicable to those limited
situations where intentional torts are actionable.
The traditional proposition that in negligence
actions the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was
negligent and that such negligence was the proximate
cause of his injury is not altered by the FELA. The
trier of fact must be convinced that the weight of the
evidence supports both a finding of negligence and
causation before he may find for the plaintiff.
In Siciliano v. Denver & R. G. W.R. Co., 12 Utah
2d 183, 364 P.2d 413 (1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S.

979, there was no reason to consider the question of

causation because the plaintiff had not proved negligence. In reversing a verdict for the plaintiff in this
FELA case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Under the facts of this case we feel constrained to and do hold that as a matter of
law there was no proof offered by plaintiff,
by controverted evidence or otherwise, from
which reasonable persons could find that defendant was guilty of negligence in any degree." 364 P.2d at 414.
Justice Crockett dissented, not because he believed
plaintiff didn't have to prove negligence, but because
he felt the court should be extremely reluctant to reject the findings made by the trier of fact. In the instant case the finder of fact has found no negligence
and no causation. See Point III, infra.
In Sprickerhoff v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 55 N.E.
2d 532, 537 (Ill. 1944) , the court approved the trial
court's instruction to the jury in an FELA case that
it must find that "the preponderance or greater weight
of the evidence" supports a finding that defendant was
negligent and that this negligence was the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury before it could find the defendant liable. For additional FELA cases holding that
plaintiff has the burden of proving (not merely the
burden of presenting evidence) both the negligence of
the defendant and that this negligence was the proxi-
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mate cause of plaintiff's injury see, e.g., Herdman v.
Pennsylvania ll. Co., 352 U.S. 518 (1957); Stone v.
New York, C., & St. L. R. Co., 344 U.S. 407 (1953);
Sligh v. Columbia, Newberry & Laurens R. Co., 250 F.
Supp. 490 (D.C. S.C. 1966), aff'd, 370 F.2d 979
(1966), cert. den., 386 U.S. 1007; Glinski v. New York
Central R. Co., 162 F.Supp, 23 (D.C.N.Y. 1956);
Cleghorn v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 289 S.W.
2d 13, 17 (Mo. 1956).
Appellant apparently confuses the fact th.at under
the FELA a plaintiff's contributory negligence is not
a complete bar to recovery, with the fact that defendant
is not liable if the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injury is his own negligence. In the latter case, the plaintiff has not proved that the negligence of the defendant
. was the proximate cause of the injury. Thus, if the
sole proximate cause of the injury is the negligence of
the plaintiff, the defendant should not be found liable,
and the cases uniformly so hold.
"Virtually every case in the annotation
recognizes that recovery may be denied if the
negligence of the injured employee was in
fact the sole proximate cause of his injury."
Annotation, 59 ALR 2d 580, 643.
POINT III
THE COURT SHOULD NOT REVERSE
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIER OF FACT

7
UNLESS THERE IS A COMPLETE ABSEN'CE OF PROBATIVE FACTS TO SUPPORT SAID FINDINGS.
The general standard for reviewing the lower
court's findings of facts is expressed in Lake v. Pinder,
13 Utah 2d 76, 368 P.2d 593, 594 ( 1962).
"The principal question presented is
whether there is substantial evidence which
furnishes a reasonable basis in support of the
lower court's findings of fact when the evidence is viewed most favorable to such fin4ing." [Emphasis added.]
This standard is not changed when the court is reviewing an FELA case. Indeed, it is even likely that it
is more difficult for the appellate court to reverse such
findings in FELA cases. In Lavender v. K urn, 327
U.S. 645 (1946), a jury verdict had been granted to
plaintiff. The defendant appealed, demonstrating that
it was physically impossible for the plaintiff's theory of
injury to be correct. Plaintiff claimed that the injuries
occurred when a mail hook swung from the side of defendant's train. Defendant had demonstrated that given
the height of the deceased, the distance from the ground
to the hook, and the distance from the tracks to the
nearest mounds of cinders, it was not possible for the
hook to strike the deceased. In spite of this strong evi-
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dence, the United States Supreme Court refused to reverse the jury's findings.
" . . . [T]he inference that Haney was
killed by the hook cannot be said to be unsupported by probative facts or to be so unreasonable as to warrant taking the case from the
Jury.
"It is true that there is evidence tending
to show that it was physically and mathematically impossible for the hook to strike
Haney. And there are facts from which it
might reasonably be inferred that Haney was
murdered. But such evidence has become irrelevant upon appeal_, there being a reasonable
basis in the record for inferring that the hook
struck Haney. The jury having made that inference, the respondents were not free to relitigate the factual dispute in a reviewing court.

***

"It is no answer to say that the jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecturt!.
Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence
is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and
conjecture is required on the part of those
whose duty it is to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to them to be the most reasonable inference. Only when there is a complete
absence of probative facts to support the con-
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clusion reached does a reversible error appear.
But where, as here, there is an evidentiary
basis for the jury's verdict, the jury is free to
discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate
court's function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being
immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion
is more reasonable." [Emphasis added] 66 S.
Ct. at 743-44.
Since the FELA is a federal cause of action
(created by Congress), it is arguable that for the purposes of this appeal the precise language of the United
States Supreme Court in Lavender is more applicable
than the standard expressed in Lake. However, even
though the facts of Lavender, and the Court's word
choice, make the federal standard appear somewhat
more restrictive, a decision to apply one standard instead of another is not necessary. Both standards reflect
the same concept; appellate courts should be very reluctant to overturn the findings of a trier of fact and
when such findings can be supported by the evidence,
the appellate court should uphold them - even if it
would have found otherwise on the same evidence. See
Chief Justice Crockett's dissent in Siciliano v. Denver
& R. G. TV. R. Co., 12 Utah 2d 188, 864 P.2d 418
( 1961), appeal dismissed, 868 U.S. 979.
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POINT IV
THE JUDG1\1ENT OF NO CAUSE OF ACTION SHOULD BE AFFIRJ\JED BECAUSE
THE TRIER OF FACT CONCLUDED THAT
THE APPELLANT HAD NOT PROVED
TI-IAT HIS INJURIES 'VERE CAUSED BY
EITHER THE TORTIOUS OR NEGLIGENT
ACTS OF THE RESPONDENT OR ANY OF
ITS AGENTS AND THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THIS CONCLUSION.
The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, made
the following fin<lings and conclusions:

"FINDINGS OF FACT

* * *

During the period of time the train was
stopped at vVinnemucca that day, the plaintiff
consumed sufficient intoxicating beverages
that, by the time the train started to move out,
he was intoxicated.
4.

The plaintiff at the time this train
started to move out, staggered toward the train
in his intoxicated condition, carrying a sack
full of beer. Foreman Baca told plaintiff that
he could not board the train with the beer but
'
plaintiff continued to attempt to get aboard
with the beer. The foreman wrested the sack
of beer from the plaintiff and the plaintiff,
5.
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being in an intoxicated condition, then lost his
balance and fell to the ground.

* * *
7. Some two or three years prior to this
incident, plaintiff had complained of pains in
his lower back and was x-rayed and otherwise
treated by doctors in Stockton and Sacramento, California for that back condition.
8. Plaintiff had a degenerative disc
problem in his lower back which pre-existed,
and was not caused or significantly aggrevated, by the incident at 'Vinnemucca, Nevada
in July, 1965.

* * *
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

* * *

Plaintiff's own voluntary intoxication, and his conduct and actions while so intoxicated on July 22, 1965, at \Vinnemucca,
Nevada, constitute the sole proximate cause of
any injuries he may have sustained at that
time.
3.

"r
estern Pacific's Foreman, in attempting to prevent plaintiff from boarding
4.

a moving train in an intoxicated condition or
from bringing intoxicating beverages aboard
that train, was acting in the interest of the
safety of the plaintiff and the other members
of the train crew and in that respect, conduct-
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ed himself as any reasonable prudent person
charged with his responsibilities \Yould have
done under the same circumstances.
Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed, no cause of action." [Emphasis added.]
5.

It is apparent from the above findings and conclusions that the lower court concluded the respondent was
not negligent, and if appellant was injured at all during the incident in question, it was solely because of his
own actions and not those of others. Since appellant had
the burden of proving both negligence (or intentionally
tortious conduct) and causation, it was proper for the
lower court to find for the respondent if it found an absence of either. Given the standard for review of the
findings of fact, the focus for this court's inquiry should
be restricted to the following issue. Viewed most favorably to the respondent, is there evidence which supports
either one of the fallowing conclusions: ( 1) Neither the
respondent nor any of its agents committed a negligent
or intentionally tortious act; or ( 2) If the respondent
or one of its agents committed a negligent or intentionally tortious act, said act was not the proximate cause of
any injury to appellant. The evidence is more than sufficient to support one of these conclusions.

The evidence supports a finding that Foreman
Baca did not intentionally kick appellant.
1.
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Appellant's complaint was in two counts. The first
connt alleged that Foreman Baca "kicked the plaintiff
as plaintiff was boarding the moving train causing
plaintiff to fall upon the ground on his back." The only
witness to testify that there was even anything remoteJy resembling a kick was the appellant. According to
appellant, Foreman Baca was on the train and, as appellant boarded the moving train, Baca kicked appellant
on the chest, caus;ng him to fall. (T 18)
This testimony is totally inconsistent with the testimony of two bystanders who witnessed the incident.
'Vitnesses Smith and Wade testified that Baca was
standing on the ground during the entire incident and
that Baca at no time kicked the appellant. According to
these witnesses, Baca approached the appellant and told
him to drop the sack of beer he was carrying before he
boarded the train. After appellant refused to drop the
beer, Baca either grabbed the sack or appellant's arm
which was holding the sack and this caused the sack to
fall. This was the only contact the witnesses other than
appellant noticed. After the sack was taken from him,
there was a short time lapse before appellant fell. Both
vV ade and Smith testified that appellant was staggering
during the whole incident because of his intoxicated
state, and that appellant because of this intoxicated
concl'.tion lost his balance and fell. (T 111-15, 129-181)
The credibility of appellant's testimony was made
even more doubtful by additional inconsistencies with
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the testimony of bystanders. Appellant testified that
he only had two beers prior to the incident in question,
and that these were consumed in a bar in Winnemucca
that he and l\fr. Smith went into after 1\-fr. Smith took
him to town. ( T 89) Forrest Smith flatly denied ever
going into town with appellant before the incident with
Foreman Baca, and testified that he had not on that
day been in any bar with appellant. ( T 111) The appellant denied that just prior to the incident with Baca
he had been sitting under some trees with a group of
men drinking beer. He denied drinking any beer during this time. ( T 90) Witnesses Wade and Smith, who
were in that group, both testified that appellant had
consumed an excessive amount of Nevada beer while
drinking with the group under the trees. ( T 107-09,
128-30)

Appellant also testified that he only had one can
of beer in the sack that he was carrying when he was
attempting to board the train. ( T 89) The other witnesses testified that they personally observed at least
a six pack of beer strewn around on the ground after
the sack fell from appellant's arms. (T 114, 133) Appellant stated that after his fall, witness Smith took
He further stated
him to the hospital in
that no one else went with them, and that the only person who examined him was a nurse. ( T 98) Both Mr.
Smith and Mr. Wade testified that Wade had accompanied Smith and appellant to the hospital and there
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was no female nurse or doctor in this small community
clinic. (T 116, 132) Appellant's testimony was even
internally inconsistent. For example, at one point he
testified that the train was carrying freight (T 85) and
then two or three questions later, testified that he didn't
know whether or not the train was carrying freight.
(T 8.5-86)

In the light most favorable to respondent, the evidence shows that Foreman Baca never kicked appellant
as the first count of the complaint alleges. The evidence
further demonstrates that appellant's entire testimony
could have been disregarded by a reasonable, prudent
trier of fact because of appellant's lack of perception
at the time of the incident (due to his intoxication),
and/ or lack of veracity (due to his high interest in the
outcome of the case).

Foreman Baca did not act negligently during
the incident in question.
2.

The complaint's only other count alleged that Foreman Baca was negligent and that said negligence is imputed to the respondent. Thus, there is no count in the
complaint alleging an intentional battery perpetrated
by any means other than a kick. However, respondent
believes that even if an intentional tort is deemed included in appellant's second count, there is sufficient
evidence to support a finding that Baca neither committed an intentional tort nor a negligent act during
the time period relevant to this case.
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The evidence sufficiently supports a finding that
the respondent has a policy against permitting intoxicaf ng beverages in railroad cars such as the one involved in this instance. This policy was formulated to
protect the safety of the respondent's employees. The
policy was well known to the appellant. I-le knew that
he could not bring beer on the train, and that the foreman was instructed to not permit an employee to board
a train carrying beer. (T 42-48, 89, 106, 182) If, in
fact, Foreman Baca did touch appellant, the small
amount of force and contact utilized by Baca to take
the sack away from appellant was reasonable under the
circumstances, and impliedly consented to by the appellant.
It is possible to find support in the evidence that
Baca did not touch either the appellant or the sack.
Mr. Smith testified as follows:
Q

And what did you observe h;m do next?

A

Try to get on the car.

Q

Did he have any difficulty getting on?

A

He was running. The train was moving.
Took a couple of free grabs to grab hold
of that grab iron. Then he stepped up on
the steps. About that time Baca got to
him, reached for the sack or his arm, I
don't know which, but anyway Orosczo
came back off the car and was rolling on
the ground.
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Q

Now, let me back up just a minute. Did
Mr. Baca at any time when you were
watching him come and get' on that particular subject car?

A

No.

Q

Was he at all times on the ground?

A

Yes.

Q

Did you ever see Mr. Baca or anyone else
put a foot on
Orosczo's chest or any
part of his body and kick him?

A

No.

Q

Did you see any action on the part of l\ilr.
Baca, or any "\\T estern employee, that
would even appear to be a kick with a
foot?

A

No." (T 112-113) [Emphasis added.]

From evidence such as this, the lower court could have
concluded that while the witnesses Smith and Wade
were close enough to clearly perceive that Baca was not
on the train and did not kick appellant, they were not
close enough to determine whether or not actual contact was ever made between Baca and appellant's arm
or the sack.
Even if the lower court concluded that there had
been some form of contact between Foreman Baca and
either appellant or the sack, the evidence substantially
supports a finding that this contact was only minor,
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and limited to the amount of contact reasonably necessary to prevent the beer from coming on the train. Witness Wade testified as follows :
"Q

All right. Now, can you tell us in your
own words what you saw when the train
started to pull out?

A

Well, Orosczo started for the train with
the beer in his right arm and Baca hollered at him to put the sack of beer down
and you can get on his train. He was in
the car door.

Q

Chick Baca, the foreman. You say he was
in his-

A

In his office car.

Q

His office car? Is this back to the east or
off the subject car?

A

To the east of, and he kept heading for
the train staggering toward the train, and
Baca outrun him to the door and he was
reaching up to grab the rail. He had one
foot onto the steps and Baca told him to
put the beer down and he could ride, but
he kept on getting on to the train with
the beer, and Baca knocked the beer out
of his hand. At that time he lost his footing and fell between the tracks there-the
toe path.

19

';j

Q

Did you ever hear Mr. Orosczo say that
he would put it down, or that he wouldn't
put it down?

A

He wouldn't.

Q

He refused?

A

Yes.

* * *

''Q

And Baca came from behind and grabbed
at his right arm?

A

Grabbed the beer sack. He didn't want no
beer on the cars." (T 130-31, 140) [Emphasis added.] See also T- 141-43.

The above quote, and the previous quote of Mr.
Smith's testimony, demonstrate that the evidence
sustains a finding that Foreman Baca only touched
the sack, or the arm holding the sack, and that the force
he applied was limited to the amount that would cause
the sack to fall, and was not enough to cause a man to
lose his balance. Therefore, the trial court was justified
in concluding that Baca had not acted negligently. A
reasonable, prudent person placed in the same position
as Foreman Baca (charged with the responsibility for
his crew and the enforcement of safety rules) would
have <lone the same thing under similar circumstances.
The limited touching, and application of only the
arnount of force necessary to remove the sack, was impliedly consented to by the appellant. The appellant
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knew that he was violating the railroad's safety rule,
and that if he didn't drop the sack when the foreman
told him to, the foreman might make some effort to
prevent the beer from coming on board. Obviously,
appellant did not consent to the use of force that would
endanger his safety, but by violating the rule he did
consent to a certain degree of minimal physical contact with the foreman. This is analagous to a basketball
player impliedly consenting to some contact with other
players during a ball game. As here, the player does not
consent to unreasonable contact and force, but would
have no cause of action against a fellow player for an
incidental contact, even though basketball is a "noncontact" sport. In this case, the evidence was sufficient
to support a conclusion that F'oreman Baca only applied
force to the sack, and such force was limited to only
that which would probably cause the sack to fall, and
was not enough to cause a reasonable man to anticipate
resultant injury. Appellant was violating the company
rules and by doing so impliedly consented to this de
minimis contact. Cf. Unadilla Valley R. Co. v. Caldine,
278 U.S. 189 (1928).

Even if Foreman Baca did negligently or
otherwise touch appellant, appellant's fall was not
caused by said touching.
3.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Foreman Baca
acted tortiously or negligently, the evidence is sufficient
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to support a conclusion that this conduct was not the
cause of appellant's fall. Mr. Smith testified as follows:

Q

Now, will you describe for us, please, Mr.
Smith, the condition of Mr. Orosczo at
the time you say the hour and a half had
elapsed and the train had started to move?

A

I would say he was intoxicated.

* * *
"Q

Now, did he approach the train in a steady
manner, or was he staggering in some
way?

A

It was a sort of a staggered manner,
runnmg.

Q

Did you see that he had difficulty in getting hold of the rail?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, is it true that despite the fact this
rendering would indicate that you have to
jump up about five feet to get on, how far
off the ground could these stairs come
down below the car level itself?

A

You have got about a two foot step up
to get to it.

Q

W ase the train moving slow enough at
that time in your judgment, Mr. Smith,
that one who was not intoxicated could get
up without difficulty?

22
A

Yes." (T. 111, 113-14)

Mr. Wade gave similar testimony:
"Q

So, your judgment is that some time from
three until the train pulled out, l\!Ir.
Orosczo was with this group and you saw
him there drinking beer?

A

Yes.

Q

And can you describe for us as best you
can what his condition was?

A

Intoxicated or drunk, either one.

Q

Was he having trouble walking straight?

A.

Yes.

* * *

"Q

And they got on while the train was moving?

A

No. They had already left before the
train started moving. This Orosczo remained with us there, sitting there, until
the train started to moving. Then he staggered toward the train.

Q

I see. And which route did he take?

A

Which group?

Q

Which route? Which route did he take?

A

Where would he come to? Kind of staggering west.

* * *
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"Q

0.K. Say it just the way you recall it
having been said.

A

I am so nervous-'Orosczo, put down the
beer.' And Orosczo didn't, and he continued to board the train; and by that time
Baca had already headed up to where he
was at, knocked the beer out of his hand.
I guess he just staggered around and fell
down.

*

"Q

A

* *

Did he fall to the ground at the same time
that Baca grabbed for the sack?

No. He staggered and then he fell.

* * *

"Q

'Vell, did he actually grab the sack, or
his arm, or what did he grab?

A

He grabbed for the beer-the sack of
beer-and I don't know that if he grabbed
his arm or not. I thought he grabbed the
beer and knocked the beer out of his hand,
or grabbed the beer. I don't think Chick
grabbed him, or pulled him or anything.
He hit the beer and knocked it out of his
arm and at that time he was so drunk he
couldn't stand up hardly anyhow, and he
just staggered and fell down. That's the
way I see it.

"Q

* * *

He spun around and fell on his right
side-he had his left side toward you?

2-t

A

\Vell, he just fell. Baca pulled himpulled on the sack of beer and at that time
he was staggering-he was having a hard
time getting to the car. He almost got run
over as far as I am concerned, staggering
around there, and he fell ... " ( T 129, 136,
138, 141, 142-43) [Emphasis added.]

Both of these witnesses testified that the appellant
Wade explicitly
was drunk and was staggering.
testified that there was a time lapse between the time
Baca made any contact with the appellant and the time
that the appellant fell, and that it was the appellant's
intoxicated condition and resultant staggering that
caused him to fall. ( T 141) The court's conclusion that
appellant was intoxicated, and that this was the sole
cause of any injuries he may have received, is easily
supported by the evidence.

Even if Foreman Baca was negligent and even
if such negligence was the cause of appellant's fall, appellant did not sustain the injuries complained of as a
result of said fall.
4.

The appellant contends that during the incident in
question he fell on his back, and that this caused traumatic injury to his back which resulted in a degenerative disc problem and the fusion of a couple of lumbar
and cervical vertebrae. Appellant had the burden of
proving that his back condition was caused by his fall
during the incident with Foreman Baca. Ile did not
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meet this burden, and the court found that the back
condition was not caused by the incident in question and
even pre-dated the incident. The record has an abundant
amount of evidence supporting this conclusion.
The medical evidence offered by the appellant's
witness, Dr. Lamb, made it apparent that the particular
kind of back problem suffered by the appellant is common in the general populace, and that it is even more
common in people within the appellant's age group,
and more common still in people who have done the
same kind of work as appellant.
"Q

1\

Doctor, I take it that the type of situation that you noticed in this man's back
in this modern day isn't unusual, it it?
That's true.

* * *
"Q

And also, Doctor, I suppose it's wellknown and understood by those in your
profession and particularly in your specialty that these degenerative disc changes
can, and frequently occur without trauma?

A

Yes.

Q

And that very frequently as we get
middle-aged some of us, many of us, have
low back problems resulting f r o m
changes, bony changes and from protruding discs that are caused simply by the
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normal incidence of wear and tear you
have in life?
A.

Yes.

Q

And it is a fact, is it not, that what occurs
is that the disc material, which is between
our vertebral bodies sometimes is, through
the wear and tear, it gets thinner and thinner and it will erupt without any kind of
an accident or injury?

A

Yes.

* * *

"Q

Now, is there a classical, or that's the
wrong word - is there a typical area
where you find that pain in the low back?
You might show me, Doctor, where that
is in these low back situations where a
nerve is impinged upon by a protruding
disc. I am talking about the area of 5-4where I think it's intervened here.

A

The most common space - the lower
space, which is the space between the fifth
lumbar and the sacrum, and the next most
common is L-4-5 space on up the back.
From this, I would say by far the majority of the nerve root pressures occur m
these two spaces.

Q

Yes. This was 4-5?

A

4-5, and 5-1.

* * *
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"Q

I suppose one of the reasons, Doctor, that
occurs then is that the stress and strain of
life, that's where a great deal of the wearing out of our bodies is in that fulcrum
point?

A

In lifting by far the largest stress is on
the lumbosacrum-the least movable.

Q

And protracted and prolonged lifting of
people who have heavy work commonly
causes low back pain. The industrial back,
where you have these protruding discs,
does it not?

A

Yes. I think in general people who do
heavy work are more prone toward disc
degenerative trouble than others.

"Q

A
"Q

A

* * *

Now, doctor, if you had known when you
discussed-examined him [appellant] for
the first time in 1965, that he had had a
low back pain sufficient to cause him to go
to a doctor and have X-rays taken in his
low back, would that be significant to you?
Yes.

* * *

You didn't have any history the patient
[appellant] has had any low back pain
prior to the incidents he had complained
of in July of 1965?
That's right.
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* * *

"Q

\Vhen you operated on this particular
gentleman [appellant] and got into his
back, did you find that there had been
bony growth in the back indicating that
there had been an arthritic involvement
and development prior to the time you got
into the back?

A

Yes. And reading the operative report on
the lumbar spine-that was one of the
reasons we removed the entire laminae on
one side, there seemed to be some encroachment on the spinal canal between
the laminae and the bony growth.

Q

Now, excuse me, Doctor, had you finished?

A

Yes.

Q

So that there is a - if there is a bony
growth which is sufficient to intrude into
the canal, that would not necessarily be
traumatically connected, would it?

A

No. That's right." (T 71-72, 74-77)

The appellant's own testimony was to the effect
that people who engaged in the strenuous type of work
which he had done for many years usually had back
problems. (T 37) Furthermore, the witnesses to appellant's fall testified that he did not fall on his back ( T
115), did not fall hard enough to cause a back injury,
and walked over to the witnesses right after the fall
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\\<thout any complaint of significant back pain ( T 119,
12.5, 131, 138, 142, 143). This evidence, coupled with
the e\'i<lence that back problems similar to appellant's
commonly occur without trauma in people who do the
same type of work, would support a finding of no
causation.
Even though the above evidence was probably
sufficient, there is at least one more piece of significant
testimony. The appellant admitted that he had the same
pain in the exact same portion of his back (around the
belt-line) prior to the incident in question. He even admitted that he had sought medical treatment for his
lower back pain years prior to the date of his fall. After
testifying that he had back trouble as early as 1956
( T 6), the appellant stated that prior to the incident in
question he had gone to doctors in Stockton and Sacamento, California, for back treatment. (T 34-36) Regarding the visit to the Sacramento doctor, the appellant testified:
"Q

That was the time when you were complaining of pain as you indicated to your
counsel about the belt line and on both
sides about the mid-back?

A

Yes, but they never told me what was
wrong, and never showed me anythingand never told me what was wrong with
me.
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Q

They never told you if anything was
wrong with you? That's when you had the
the X-rays, is it not?

A

Yes, but they never told me what was
wrong with me or gave me medicine.

Q

Is that when you had the pain which you
have described along the belt line?

A

Yes. That's when I was having backache
and the foreman gave me a slip to go see
the doctor.

Q

Now, how long had you been having that
backache when the foreman gave you the
slip to go see the doctor?

A

I felt it for about a week and then I went
back to work normally." (T 36)

This evidence alone could arguably be sufficient
to support a finding that respondent did not cause appellant's back injury by any of its foreman's actions on
the day in question. \Vhen taken together with the
other evidence, the conclusion is not only supportable,
it is difficult to avoid.
The evidence is sufficient to support all four of
the above numbered conclusions, and it only need support any one of them to require this court to affirm.
The lower court listened to the testimony, observed the
demeanor of the witnesses and found on the facts that
plaintiff had not proved the elements necessary to
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sustain his cause of action. This conclusion is not patently incorrect in light of the facts in record and this court
should affirm the judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the respondent respectfully prays that the judgment of the trial court he affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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